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Abstract
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  evaluate  the  controversies  of  fiscal  and  monetary 
policies in defining business cycles in Croatia, i.e. to answer the question whether 
they can, and in what way, determine the cyclical movements. Using Hodrick- 
-Prescott filter for extracting cycles from selected macroeconomic variables for the 
period 1994-2013, this paper gives a reflection on the past relationship between 
the characteristics of Croatian fiscal and monetary policies by testing whether 
these two economic pillars are in fact coordinated over a business cycle. We found 
that both fiscal and monetary variables exhibit counter-cyclical behaviour with 
relatively weak correlation to the real GDP suggesting that they are coordinated 
during a business cycle but their reach is ambiguous. Finally, we conclude that 
fiscal and monetary policies in Croatia are constrained by internal and external 
factors, and thus they often cannot accomplish their counter-cyclical role.
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1. Introduction
Inconsistency  in  macroeconomic  policy  and  government  failures  in  recognizing 
potential  development  moments  lead  to  ‘decision-making  dilemma’;  should 
economic  policy  be  determined  by  a  legislation  rule  or  by  a  policymaker’s 
discretion (Benazić and Tomić, 2013)? From time to time, economy can experience 
inflation and deflation stages that are persistent and long. These stages that last over 
one or more business cycles are often sufficiently long to be analyzed, allowing to 
some extent macroeconomic manoeuvrability. Many economists that dwell about 
‘market clearing’ grasp believe that fiscal and monetary policies can be coordinated 
to eliminate negative trends (gap) in output, unemployment and prices. The bigger 
the gap is, the stronger the impact of fiscal and monetary policies must be to have 
stabilizing effects on the economy. Optimal fiscal policy deals with the combination 
of  taxes  and  debt  return  that  maximizes  welfare  and  is  consistent  with  the 
government spending path (Manzano, Perez and Ruiz, 2005). Moreover, it is often 
questioned (even throughout theoretical debates between the Keynesian position, 
monetarist and rational expectation/real cycles revolution about the effectiveness 
of the active monetary policy) if monetary policy can directly affect performance 
of the real economy or can it be used only to eliminate or diminish shocks. Next 
relevant question is whether targeting price stability is really a legitimate way to 
ensure  macroeconomic  stability?  There  is  a  little  doubt  that  cyclical  property 
of fiscal and monetary policies is fascinating scientific field that proved to be the 
fundament  for  fierce  debates  in  economic  literature,  as  well  as  in  professional 
circles.
Fiscal policy seeks to stabilize the economy by creating a negative feedback when 
income  deviates  from  its  potential  level.  Under  pressure  from  fiscal  changes, 
economy will be pushed to its potential level. Thus, if the demand is high and 
inflation threats loom, these changes will drag demand down. If the demand is 
weak and there also exists the problem of underemployed resources, changes in 
fiscal policy will push the demand up. The negative feedback loop is necessary 
but not sufficient condition for the stabilization process. If the economy operates 
with lags, which are fairly large compared to the fluctuations we tend to control, 
intervention can cause further destabilization, rather than mitigate the problems 
(Sharma and Tomić, 2012). Following the rise up of Keynesian theory, theoretical 
linkage between the monetary policy and business cycles has become an intriguing 
issue  within  macroeconomic  policy.  This  relationship  is  somewhat  arguable 
because there is still the question of size and the significance of monetary policy 
effects on business cycle dynamics. Contemporary orthodoxy holds that monetary 
authority has a central role in stabilizing the economy through its focus on price 
stability and in providing a stable and relatively trustworthy nominal ambience in 
which economic decisions are best made (Šimić, 2011). No doubt that transmission 
mechanism  differs  across  countries.  However,  there  is  evidence  in  economic Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia... 
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literature that suggests money being one of the factors inducing business cycles, 
though not the only one. 
Complexities  of  macroeconomic  relations  in  Croatia  reveal  structural  problems 
that dwell upon both fiscal and monetary policies. Besides ensuring sound public 
finance  (which  is  the  main  objective),  fiscal  policy  in  Croatia  needs  to  follow 
another objective i.e. tax harmonization within the European Union (plus limitation 
of  Maastricht  criteria).  Croatia  is  a  country  with  one  of  the  highest  shares  of 
public  revenue  and  expenditure  in  national  product.  The  structure  of  revenues 
and expenditures seems to be a greater problem than their level. As Družić (2009) 
well points out, it is not in compliance with Croatian economic needs, let alone 
with  European  Union  requirements.  The  macro  indicators  (deposit-investment 
ratio, national product growth, unemployment...) and micro-indicators (company 
business  results,  economic  insolvency...)  indicate  that  the  tax  capacity  of  the 
country is indeed overstrained, meaning that public consumption exceeds Croatian 
economic capacities. In addition to its volume, the structure of public consumption 
does  not  correspond  to  economic  needs  either  because  almost  50%  of  total 
public expenditure is asset and service expenditure which are often perceived as 
unproductive, concludes Družić (2009). Though we have witnessed important fiscal 
adjustments (introduction of value added tax, excise duties, tackling tax evasion, 
changes in pension (HZMO) and health (HZZO) insurance structures, etc.), high 
budget and external deficit that came out of the discrepancy between planned and 
budgeted fiscal targets points us to the mediocre quality of economic forecasting 
and lack of full political commitment to fiscal targets. Croatia has several fiscal 
rules, however it lacks and explicit – enforceable fiscal responsibility framework 
(World Bank, 2011). Due to a strong and prolonged economic crisis which was 
enhanced  by  late  fiscal  adjustments  and  credit  rating  downgrade,  Croatia  was 
pressured to make some fiscal cuts, however it seems that fiscal austerity brought 
only negative growth rates (though higher public revenues) and that will in the 
long-run probably result in serious fiscal problems undermining the welfare state. 
Let us review how monetary policy tackled the problem. 
Monetary policy in Croatia is focused on one goal only and that is exchange rate 
stability (exchange rate anchor to euro) i.e. price stability. Although, high degree 
of the euroization of Croatian economy (78% of all saving and time deposits in 
2012 were kept in foreign currency, such that the current crisis in Eurozone did not 
seriously erode faith in euro or dwindled faith in kuna) can explain why Croatian 
national bank (CNB) pursues this anchor policy, but the fact is that interest rate 
channel  of  monetary  transmission  does  not  function  in  the  country  (Benazić, 
2012). The main characteristic feature of Croatian monetary system is that CNB 
does not use anchor policy to influence the balance of payment or GDP but only 
tries to preserve eo ipso a stability of the exchange rate as a precondition for a 
stable economic environment that is largely faced with foreign currency liabilities. Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia...   
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Limitations of monetary policy arise from both, external and internal vulnerability 
of  Croatian  economy.  External  vulnerability  has  burst  out  from  unsustainable 
foreign debt, high balance of payment deficit, dependability on tourism and inflow 
of foreign currencies and also from the fact that the inflow of foreign capital was 
strongly correlated to the entry in the European Union. Internal vulnerability arises 
from large fiscal deficits and the structure of loans which are mostly denominated 
in foreign currency (Benazić and Tomić, 2013). Consequently, stable exchange rate 
regime of the CNB causes limitation in conducting monetary policy in Croatia since 
it is mostly directed towards neutralization of the external shocks and the stability 
of financial system. Is this not a primary objective of every monetary authority? 
The period of last global crisis certainly proved the audacity of CNB who helped 
the real economy not to lose its purpose by releasing and injecting relatively high 
banking reserves into banking system as a new liquidity boost.
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  evaluate  the  controversies  of  fiscal  and  monetary 
policies in defining business cycles in Croatia, i.e. to answer the question can they 
and in what way determine the cyclical movements. Using Hodrick-Prescott filter 
(Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) for extracting cycles from selected macroeconomic 
variables  for  the  period  1994-2013,  this  paper  gives  a  reflection  on  the  past 
relationship between the characteristics of Croatian fiscal and monetary policies by 
testing whether these two economic pillars are coordinated. Hence, due to a specific 
structure  of  the  Croatian  economy,  our  hypothesis  is  that  fiscal  and  monetary 
policies are in fact coordinated over a business cycle. In conformity with the results, 
we will try to identify the variables that can be used as instruments and discuss their 
possible implications. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  While  Section  2  provides  the 
theoretical  background  through  literature  review,  in  Section  3  we  discuss  the 
methodological  concept  of  the  research.  Empirical  analysis  and  results  are 
introduced in Section 4, while Section 5 critically evaluates the effects of fiscal and 
monetary policies in Croatia. Finally, Section 6 provides the concluding remarks.
2. Literature review
Business cycles at their peak can be very harmful for the whole economy. Atop, 
economic booms establish abruptly large profits for the entrepreneurial class and 
obstruct  the  way  middle  or  ‘working’  class  can  earn  constant  incomes.  These 
problems are often intensified by a strong increase in prices. At the bottom, business 
cycles produce negative growth rates, unemployment and poverty. Therefore, it is in 
interest of society to (try to) control cyclical behaviour of an economy. Although the 
concept of economic stability can be interpreted in many ways, it usually implies 
the stability of the whole economic system, and not of its parts. This brings us to the Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2014 • vol. 32 • sv. 1 • 75-99  79
next question: what is the objective of such policy: to ensure higher growth rates, to 
achieve full employment or to avoid price rampage. Moreover, stabilization policy 
has to be flexible too, because some market failures would not need to be corrected 
at all. Conventionally in the literature, most stabilization measures are attributed 
to monetary policy, whereas fiscal policy is commonly used as a counter-cyclical 
measure. However, both monetary and fiscal policies are of great importance for the 
stabilization process.
There is a large body of empirical work on the relationship between fiscal policy 
and business cycle. Consistent with the Keynesian and/or neoclassical perspective, 
empirical evidence of counter-cyclical fiscal policy can be found in Fiorito (1997), 
Agenor,  McDermott  and  Prasad  (1999),  Fatas  and  Mihov  (2001),  Lane  (2003), 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004), Talvi and Vegh (2005), Alesina, Campante 
and  Tabellini  (2008),  Lee  and  Sung  (2007),  etc.  (extensive  reflection  on  the 
literature can be found in Battaglini and Coate, 2008). Still, the counter-cyclical 
characteristic of fiscal policy is in fact a country (or a group of countries) or time 
specific. There are also papers that study pro-cyclical characteristic of fiscal policy: 
Gavin and Perotti (1997), Stein, Talvi and Grisanti (1998), Talvi and Vegh (2000), 
etc.  (see  Lee  and  Sung,  2007).  Gavin  and  Perotti  (1997)  argue  that  decision-
makers may not be able to use fiscal policies as stabilization tools due to stringent 
credit constraints that prevent them from borrowing during economic downturns. 
Additionally, these governments are also usually forced to run pro-cyclical policies 
since they are required to repay their debt. Talvi and Vegh (2000) reveal a pro-
cyclical pattern in a wider sample of developing countries. There are few interesting 
papers  that  brought  additional  dimension  to  the  analysis  of  cyclical  behaviour 
within the fiscal policy research framework.
Using a comprehensive data-set of 22 members of the OECD and 72 non-OECD 
countries, and instrumental variable (IV) estimation, Lee and Sung (2007) showed 
that  current  expenditures,  subsidies  and  transfers  move  counter-cyclically  while 
taxes and capital expenditures move pro-cyclically. Namely, fiscal policy was found 
to respond asymmetrically over economic fluctuations (important implications for 
the issue of fiscal soundness) and that government works as a stabilizer (current 
expenditures  and  social  security  expenditures  are  key  components  in  counter-
cyclical response). Further, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) suggested that the 
‘lack of financial depth’ hinders the ability of governments to implement counter-
cyclical fiscal policies. Their paper implies that governments are not able to adopt 
expansionary  fiscal  policies  in  bad  times  if  they  have  limited  access  to  (either 
domestic or external) funds and if expansionary fiscal policies worsen the quality 
of the country’s assets. Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) showed that countries 
are unable to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policies if they: (1) lack wide access to 
domestic and foreign sources of financing, (2) exhibit lower levels of institutional 
quality, and (3) have multiple veto points in the political process —and, specially, Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia...   
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in the fiscal process (which is a feature of more democratic regimes). Their results 
are consistent with the statement that political distortions and market failures may 
explain the pro-cyclical bias of fiscal policies in many developing countries. To 
conclude: implementation of fiscal policy has many practical problems that are 
often burdensome and prone to criticisms thereby suggesting that it alone can not 
solve all the problems in the economy, hence monetary policy must go hand in 
hand.
Many  economists  emphasize  the  importance  of  empirical  evidence  between 
monetary and real variables as it provides information about the way in which 
private agents react to business cycles (shocks) and the way how monetary policy 
is managed in order to respond to these shocks. The real business cycle theory 
challenging Keynesian views suggest that economic fluctuations do not arise as the 
result of a monetary shock but from an external shock such as innovation. There 
are several ways to analyze the conceptual relation between monetary policy and 
business cycles. Most often we find studies that associate the volatility of monetary 
variables with the output volatility in a way they want to determine the nature of 
that relation (pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical) having in mind the possible time lags. 
Recent theories and empirical evidence provide more explicit scope of business 
cycles asymmetry which is important because if the cyclical asymmetries can be 
explained by the differences in monetary policy, then we could describe particular 
monetary phenomena within the observed asymmetry (Kakes, 1998). Interesting 
theoretical and empirical papers on the subject of measuring relation (at least in 
some aspects) between monetary policy and business cycles are: Kakes (1998), 
De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1999), Karame and Olmedo (2002), Korenok and 
Radchenko (2004), Rabanal (2004) Sorensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005), Korap 
(2006)  etc.  (extensive  reflection  on  the  literature  can  be  found  in  Benazić  and 
Tomić, 2013).
We found heterogeneous research patterns associated with business cycles analysis 
in Croatia. Ahec-Šonje (2000) and again Bačić and Vizek (2006, 2008) calculated 
composite leading indicator of the Croatian economy (CROLEI) whose purpose 
was to forecast classical business and growth cycles. On the other hand, Cerovac 
(2005) developed new composite indicators which have the purpose to identify 
and  predict  cyclical  expansions  and  contractions.  Šonje  and  Vrbanc  (2000) 
examined  the  similarities  in  Central  European  economic  area  by  analyzing  the 
relationship between business cycles in Germany, Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Croatia. Vučković (2010) examined political business cycle theory by providing 
the  overview  of  theoretical  background  and  empirical  analysis  of  opportunistic 
political cycles in Croatia. Recent research conducted by Jovančević and Arčabić 
(2011) provided interesting results: Croatian economy exhibits lower volatility and 
persistence of nominal and real macroeconomic variables during the business cycles 
compared to the EU countries. By analyzing relationship between monetary policy Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia... 
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and business cycles, Benazić and Tomić (2013) have taken two stands from which 
complexities in policy-making arise. First complexity defines the basic limitation of 
CNB in conducting at least a partial pro-growth monetary policy (this limitation is 
even more amplified by the Maastricht criteria which CNB has to follow). In such 
manner CNB consciously hands over its governing ability to predetermined rule of 
exchange rate stability. Second complexity is of conceptual nature and related to the 
former. Disproportion in lags/leads behaviour of the Croatian monetary variables 
(money supply, exchange rates, gross domestic product deflator, consumer prices) 
suggests that possible fine-tuning efforts could turn into unintended destabilizing 
forces because of uncertainty about contemporaneous economic activity as the data 
provides mixed signal such that there is no room for implementation of appropriate 
instruments for responding to emerging or expected economic conditions (Sprinkel, 
1986). Further, Rukelj (2009) concluded that fiscal and monetary policies behave as 
substitutes both having dominant effect on economic activity only in the short-run, 
whereas in the medium and long-run economic activity is dominated by its own 
dynamics. This conclusion could have significant implications for our study.
3.  Methodology
In order to evaluate cyclical components of fiscal and monetary policies we have 
followed the works of Stock and Watson (1998), Agresti and Mojon (2001), and 
Napoletano, Roventini and Sapio (2005). Though their work was based on Baxter-
King filter, we used Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter that has come to be recognised 
as standard method for removing long run movements from the time series in the 
business cycle literature3.
The  problem  of  the  optimal  method  to  decompose  a  data  series  into  two 
components (long term trend and stationary cycle) is still much debated. In the 
context of the business cycle analysis, this problem is much more important if the 
entire analysis that follows it is based on the results of such filtering method. Taking 
into consideration fairly large literature that is criticizing HP filter, Ravn and Uhlig 
(2002) emphasised that this filtering method withstood the test of time and the 
intensity of discussion and criticism remarkably well, so it appear it will most likely 
remain the standard method for detrending in theoretically oriented researches for a 
long time to come. The HP filter focuses at removing a smooth trend τt from some 
given data yt by solving next equation:
  ∑
=
− + − − − + −
1
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1 1
2 ) )) ( ) (( ) (( min
t
t t t t t t t y τ τ τ τ λ τ
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3  For an insightful analysis on different methods of filtering and their quantitative and qualitative 
effects within business cycle interpretations see Burnside (1998) and Canova (1999).Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia...   
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so the residual yt − τt is then commonly referred to as the business cycle component. 
This is actually a linear filter that requires previous specification of a parameter 
known  as  lambda  (λ).  Giving  the  form  of  time  series  data  (annually,  quarterly 
or monthly) this parameter tunes the smoothness of the trend i.e. penalizes the 
acceleration in the trend component relative to the cycle component. Having both, 
intuitive  and  economic  background,  HP  filter  has  been  applied  in  a  number  of 
relevant studies (Kydland and Prescott (1977), Hansen (1985), Backus, Kehoe and 
Kydland (1992), Blackburn and Ravn (1992) etc.) but what is more important it 
has been an unavoidable filtering method used in empirical researches similar to 
ours, for example (De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1999), Šonje and Vrbanc (2000), 
Korap  (2006),  Jovančević  and Arčabić  (2011),  etc.:  see  in  Benazić  and  Tomić 
(2013)). 
According  to  Stock  and  Watson  (1998)  and  Napoletano,  Roventini  and  Sapio 
(2005), co-movements between variables are revealed through the cross-correlation 
of the cyclical component of each series with the cyclical component of real gross 
domestic  product  as  a  benchmark  variable,  which  is  thought  to  represent  the 
business cycle. This is the correlation between xt and yt+k, where xt is the filtered 
series and yt+k is the k-quarter lead of the filtered logarithm of real gross domestic 
product. A large positive correlation at k = 0 (i.e. around lag zero) indicates pro-
cyclical behaviour of the series; a large negative correlation at k = 0 indicates 
counter-cyclical behaviour; and no correlation indicates acyclical behaviour of the 
series. A maximum correlation at, for example, k = –1 indicates that the cyclical 
component of the variable tends to lag the aggregate business cycle by one quarter. 
In other words, if the absolute maximum (or minimum) is achieved at some real 
gross  domestic  product  lead,  then  the  variable  is  denoted  as  leading,  whereas 
it is called lagging in the opposite case4. Finally, coincident variables are those 
displaying the bulk of their cross-correlation with real gross domestic product at 
lag zero. Furthermore, calculated standard deviations are comparable across series 
only when the series have the same units. For the series that appear in logarithms, 
the units correspond to percentage deviations from trend growth paths. Further facts 
on the predictive ability of macroeconomic variables are obtained through bivariate 
(pairwise) Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969) between the real gross domestic 
product and other variables. 
Therefore, in order to analyze the volatility we have calculated standard deviations 
(relative values) and cross-correlation (to estimate the degree to which two series 
are  correlated)  and  autocorrelation  (for  finding  repeating  patterns)  coefficients, 
introduced time lags/leads to evaluate time analogy between the variables and in 
addition, we have obtained bivariate (pairwise) Granger causalities to eliminate 
4  The concept of lags/leads is usually used to describe phase relations between the variables in time 
domain. Specifically it is a notion of a lag in time domain as a ‘pure delay’ in relationship.Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia... 
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any possible doubts on the subject. Since correlation does not necessarily imply 
causation in any meaningful sense, we introduced Granger (1969) which questions 
whether variable x causes variable y, as well as how much of the current y can be 
explained by past values of y and then to see if adding the lagged values of x can 
improve conclusions. Hence, y is said to be Granger-caused by x if x can help in 
predicting y or if coefficients on the lagged x are statistically significant. Again 
we have to accentuate that the statement ‘Granger-cause’ does not imply that one 
variable is the effect of the result of the other, because Granger causality measures 
precedence and information content, but does not by itself indicate causality in 
the more common use. We use bivariate (pairwise) regression of this form to test 
Granger causality between the observed variables:
yt = a0 + a1yt – 1 + … + alyt – l + b1xt – 1 + … + blx–l + et   (2)
xt = a0 + a1xt – 1 + … + alxt – l + b1yt – 1 + …+ bly–l + ut   (3)
The null hypothesis is that x does not Granges-cause y in the equation (2) and that 
y does not Granger-cause x in the equation (3). The F-statistics and supporting 
p-values are used for evaluation of joint hypothesis.
4. Data and empirical analysis
Quarterly  data  presenting  macroeconomic  variables5  for  Croatia  were  collected 
from International Financial Statistics of IMF, Croatian National Bank statistics and 
Zagreb Stock Exchange for the period of 1994Q2 – 2013Q1. Data were seasonally 
adjusted using the Census X12 seasonal adjustment procedure and then linearised 
using  the  logarithmic  transformation.  In  order  to  extract  the  business  cycle 
component that presents the stationary cycle of the variable we used smoothing 
parameter λ of 1,600 which is the standard value for quarterly frequencies6. 
The scope of this research is divided into two parts; one analysing the relation 
between  real  gross  domestic  product  (GDP_real)  and  real  fiscal  variables,  and 
the other analysing the relation between real GDP and monetary variables. Such 
distinction  can  help  in  explaining  past  relationship  between  the  characteristics 
5  Consistent statistical base for most of Croatian macroeconomic variables dates from 1997. Since 
the period prior to 1997 was characterized with inconsistency in availability and quality of data 
sources, we used estimates of quarterly gross domestic product and its compounds for the period   
1994:1 – 1996:4 calculated by Mikulić and Lovrinčević (2000).
6  Namely, Hodrick and Prescott favoured the choice of λ = 1,600 based on the argument that a 5% 
deviation from trend per quarter is relatively moderate as is an 8% change in the trend component. 
They show that lambda can be interpreted as the variance of the business cycle component divided 
by the variance of the acceleration in the trend component if the cycle component and the second 
difference of trend component are mean zero (i.e. we have normally distributed variables.Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia...   
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of  Croatian  fiscal/monetary  policy  and  business  cycles  and  reveal  us  possible 
(effective) way for macroeconomic decision-makers to manage cyclical behaviour 
of  the  Croatian  economy.  Included  fiscal  variables7  are:  real  general  government 
consumption  expenditure  (G_real),  real  (central  government)  budget  revenue 
(REV_real), real (central government) budget expenditure (EXPN_real), real budget 
revenue  to  real  GDP  ratio  (REV_real/GDP_real),  real  budget  deficit  (DEF_real) 
defined  as  real  budget  revenue  over  real  budget  expenditure  where  an  increase 
(decrease)  implies  a  budget  surplus  (deficit),  then  real  government  debt  to  real 
GDP  ratio  (GOV_DEBT_real/GDP_real),  the  Zagreb  Stock  Exchange  debt  index 
(CROBIS) and the interest rate on 365-day treasury bills (T-BILLS(365)). Included 
monetary variables8 are: real money supply (M1_real) deflated with the consumer 
price index, real total bank credits (CRED_real), average money market interest rate 
(MMR-A), overnight money market interest rate (MMR-O), average long-term interest 
rate on kuna credits indexed in foreign currency (LTR), yield curve spread (YIELD), 
nominal exchange rate of kuna to euro (HRK/EUR) where an increase (decrease) 
implies  depreciation  (appreciation)  and  real  effective  exchange  rate  (REER)  also 
deflated  with  the  consumer  price  index  where  the  increase  implies  real  effective 
appreciation.
7  All fiscal variables are deflated with consumer price index with the base year 2005=100. Central 
government data (collected from IFS) are defined according to GFS 2001 methodology. Countries 
are strongly encouraged to report their annual data using the GFS 2001 framework that is compatible 
with  the  ICS  transmission  system.  However,  if  this  is  not  possible,  data  using  the  GFS  1986 
framework will be accepted and the IMF will convert them to the GFS 2001 framework prior to their 
dissemination. Since there are no quarterly fiscal data for Croatia at central government level for the 
observed period, we use IFS converted data.
8  All money market variables are also deflated with the consumer price index. Real money supply 
and real effective exchange rate are given as index with the base year 2005=100. Due to the data 
unavailability, time series for the ratio of real central government debt in real GDP, CROBIS, 
T-BILLS (365) and yield curve start form 2003Q1. Since there are no consistent data on interest 
rate of government bonds, we will use average long-term interest rate on kuna credits indexed in 
foreign currency (LTR) to display long-term interest rate. Yield curve spread is calculated as the 
difference between the long and short-term interest rate, i.e. the long-term interest rate on kuna 
credits indexed to foreign currency and the interest rate on 365-day treasury bills. Contrary to the 
nominal exchange rate of kuna to euro, an increase in real effective exchange rate is indicating real 
effective appreciations because we used IFS statistics.Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia... 
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Table 1: Unit root tests 
Variables
ADF test PP test
Constant
Constant and 
trend
Constant
Constant and 
trend
t-stat. Adj. t-stat.
GDP_real  -3.995043 -3.967988 -3.658124 -3.637061
REV_real / GDP_real  -3.821500 -3.795601 -3.841100 -3.813299
DEF_real -5.604877 -5.558108 -5.686231 -5.636415
G_real  -4.468806 -4.436374 -3.515243 -3.486587
REV_real  -3.643277 -3.618368 -3.671983 -3.646162
EXPN_real  -3.524030 -3.497346 -5.268777 -5.228750
GOV_DEBT_real / GDP_real -2.158595 -2.116303 -1.963611 -1.950362
CROBIS -2.602924 -2.497774 -2.167993 -2.091974
T-BILLS (365) -3.218810 -3.167976 -2.525749 -2.543913
M1_real  -3.395194 -3.364998 -3.433619 -3.422806
CRED_real -3.705016 -3.664055 -2.904147 -2.867826
MMR-A -4.962806 -4.941049 -4.311171 -4.284963
MMR-O  -5.778924 -5.795448 -4.180921 -4.098241
LTR -5.948360 -5.975331 -7.372208 -7.337454
YIELD  -3.886449 -3.871638 -3.178416 -3.131425
HRK/EUR  -4.641788 -4.638569 -4.833329 -4.801661
REER -3.807314 -3.786892 -3.481653 -3.463358
Note:  Short-term  and  long-term  interest  rates,  the  interest  rate  on  365-day  T-BILLS  (365) 
and yield curve are not linearised. Due to the unavailability, data for the ratio of real central 
government  debt  in  real  GDP,  CROBIS, T-Bills  and  yield  curve  start  form  2003:1.  For  the 
implementation of ADF test the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is used. ADF test critical 
values (MacKinnon, 1996); constant: 1% level (-3.49), 5% level (-2.89), 10% level (-2.58); 
constant and trend: 1% level (-4.04), 5% level (-3.45), 10% level (-3.15). PP test critical values 
(MacKinnon, 1996): constant: 1% level (-3.49), 5% level (-2.89), 10% level (-2.58); constant 
and trend: 1% level (-4.04), 5% level (-3.45), 10% level (-3.15).
Source: Authors’ calculation
After detrending selected variables, we applied unit root tests which results are 
presented within Table 1; since the cyclical component is assumed to be stationary 
i.e. it has to fluctuate around its mean. For this purpose we have used Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller  test  (1979)  and  Phillips-Perron  test  (1988).  Generally,  all  tests 
confirmed the absence of unit root in the observed variables. Graphical displays 
also  suggest  that  they  are  stationary  in  levels.  Stationarity  of  a  variable  is  an 
important property; otherwise a spurious cycle (if the data are difference stationary) 
might lead to artificial conclusions.Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia...   
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Table  2  presents  extracted  cyclical  components  of  both,  fiscal  and  monetary 
variables, whereat we simply completed cross-correlations with lags/leads between 
the real GDP and selected variables. Namely, the sample standard deviation of a 
time series is the measure of series’ variability and the correlation with real GDP is 
the measure of series’ covariability. In addition to current correlation coefficients (t-
0), lag/lead analysis was also introduced in order to determine if some variables lag, 
lead or coincide with the fluctuations in real GDP.
In  order  to  understand  the  presented  tables  it  is  first  necessary  to  understand 
correlation  as  a  measure  of  the  linear  relationship  between  two  variables,  the 
cross-correlation function (Table 2) as just the correlation of one time series versus 
lag/led  version  of  the  other  i.e.  real  GDP,  and  the  auto-correlation  (Table  3  in 
the Appendix) as the cross-correlation of a function and itself. Thus these tables 
display the time structure and the strength of the linear relationship, both internally 
(autocorrelation) and from one to another (cross-correlation). From the results we 
can see that there exists a great similarity between the cross-correlation of fiscal and 
monetary variables that might suggest their time analogy. Results on the bivariate 
Granger causality tests (Table 4) can be also found in the Appendix.
If we take standard deviations as a measure of volatility, by analyzing Table 2 we 
can notice that almost all fiscal variables are highly volatile in comparison to real 
GDP. The most volatile variables are real budget revenue to real GDP ratio, real 
government debt to real GDP ratio, real central government budget revenue, real 
budget  deficit  and  real  central  government  expenditure.  Furthermore,  detailed 
analysis of cross-correlation coefficients suggest that most of the fiscal variables are 
weakly correlated to the real GDP. 
Yet we cannot argue against few facts. Real budget revenue to real GDP exhibits 
counter-cyclical behaviour and is a leading variable, real budget deficit displays 
leading and pro-cyclical pattern, whereas real government consumption coefficients 
suggest  that  we  have  counter-cyclical  and  lagging  variable.  Both  real  budget 
revenues  and  real  budget  expenditures  display  similar  (leading)  characteristics 
in  comparison  to  real  GDP,  however  the  signs  of  cross-correlation  coefficients 
strongly differ over the time, so it is difficult to create a conclusion about their 
pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical behaviour, revealing some heterogeneity between 
the  cyclical  behaviours.  Non-the-less,  there  are  few  indications  from  which  we 
can consider real budget revenue as a pro-cyclical and real budget expenditure 
as a counter-cyclical variable. Real government debt to real GDP ratio exhibits a 
counter-cyclical behaviour and is a lagging variable, CROBIS displays pro-cyclical 
and leading relationship to real GDP, and finally interest rate on 365-day treasury 
bills demonstrates leading and counter-cyclical pattern. Generally, we can conclude 
that most of the fiscal variables in Croatia display counter-cyclical behaviour with 
relatively weak correlation to the real GDP.Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia... 
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The  bivariate  Granger  causality  tests  shown  in  Table  4  suggest  that  real  GDP 
Granger cause real budget revenues and CROBIS, whereas between real GDP and 
real government debt to real GDP ratio as well as real GDP and interest rate on 365-
day treasury bills, the causality runs in both directions.
Foregoing results lead us to conclude that Croatian recession was accompanied 
by an increase in fiscal burden i.e. deterioration of fiscal indicators. This does not 
come to us as a surprise because the fiscal policy of a small and open economy 
such as Croatia is destined to be limited in its reach. Namely, during the recession 
due to a deceleration in economic activity, a fall in budget revenues enforces fiscal 
consolidation (in respect to Maastricht criteria, Fiscal Stability Treaty and related 
Excessive Deficit Procedure-EDP); this can bring along a suspension in EU Funds 
utilization  which  implies  additional  curtailment  of  necessarily  needed  financial 
impulse and incapacity to increase real money supply. Therefore, we can say that 
Croatian government has its work cut out because it cannot act expansively by 
using its fiscal policy actively during recession.
Turning the attention to monetary domain, by analyzing Table 2, we can notice that 
all monetary variables are less volatile (except real money supply) in comparison 
to the fiscal variables with real money supply being the most volatile one, and 
nominal exchange rate of kuna to euro and real effective exchange rate being the 
least volatile ones. Such conclusions are not strange for Croatia, having in mind 
great internal and external imbalances as well as the fact that exchange rate stability 
is the key factor in maintaining the price stability; the fundamental aspiration of the 
CNB. Next, we can see that the long-term interest rate is less volatile then short-
term interest rate. Furthermore, monetary variables are strongly correlated to the 
real GDP in comparison to fiscal variables, yet we can notice relatively weak cross-
correlation coefficients between the monetary variables and the real GDP, again real 
money supply being the most correlated variable.
Real money supply is shown to be a pro-cyclical and lagging variable. The signs 
of cross-correlation coefficients regarding real credits strongly differ over the time, 
so it is difficult to create a conclusion about their pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical 
behaviour. Interest rates display lagging and counter-cyclical pattern. Yield curve 
spread  exhibits  a  counter-cyclical  behaviour  and  is  a  lagging  variable.  Nominal 
exchange rate of kuna to euro display lagging and counter-cyclical pattern. On the 
other  side,  real  effective  exchange  rate  exhibits  pro-cyclical  behaviour.  This  is 
because different statistical source lead us to different interpretations; an increase in 
nominal exchange rate of kuna to euro (source: CNB Statistics) implies depreciation, 
whereas an increase in real effective exchange rate (source: IFS Statistics) implies 
real appreciation. Following such domain-defined feature, we can conclude that both 
of the exchange rate indicators are in fact counter-cyclical variables. Overall, most 
of the monetary variables display similar statistical properties i.e. counter-cyclical 
behaviour and relatively weak correlation to the real GDP.Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia... 
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While, the Granger causality tests do provide additional evidence on the links between 
the real GDP and monetary variables; real GDP Granger cause real money supply, 
yield curve spread and nominal exchange rate of kuna to euro, we have determined 
the mutual causality between the real GDP and real effective exchange rate.
In  general,  by  governing  money  supply  we  could  influence  business  cycles  in 
Croatia  (but  one  must  not  forget  high  volatility  related  to  this  variable,  which 
is  a  major  limitation  if  we  consider  possible  depreciation  effect).  Let’s  recall 
a mentioned limitation – increase in money supply would lead to a depreciation 
of  kuna  to  euro.  Due  to  great  external  imbalances,  import  dependency  and 
indebtedness of Croatian economy9 such action would increase debt repayments 
of different business sectors, import prices of raw materials (having pass-through 
effect  on  prices  of  domestic  products)  and  prices  of  final  goods  and  services. 
This is in compliance with CNB statement that depreciation would cause more 
damage  than  it  would  benefit  Croatian  economy  (Hrvatska  narodna  banka, 
2006). Considering the main objective of CNB, we may conclude that reliance 
on exchange rate as a factor inducing positive movements in business cycles is a 
highly unrealistic assumption within present state of Croatian economy.
Notice that CNB has also a limited influence in respect to interest rates which we 
can clearly see from low correlations coefficients between short-run interest rates 
and real GDP, as well as from its emphatic volatility. A logical conclusion since 
interest rate transmission channel actually does not work in Croatia meaning that 
monetary  authority  does  not  influence  or  administrate  money  market  interest 
rates as for example in developed financial systems of the EU or United States). 
Moreover, an increase in money supply would lower money market interest rates, 
but it would also lead to a depreciation pressure on the bilateral exchange rate 
to euro (Benazić and Tomić, 2013). But we must bear in mind that most credits 
in Croatia are indexed in foreign currency and that over 90% of Croatian banks 
are owned by foreign subjects. This fact implies revaluation of the possibility of 
influencing business cycle in Croatia. Providing that CNB tends to do so, it would 
have  to  apply  specific  monetary  instrument,  the  so-called  ‘moral  persuasion’, 
through which it would compel banks to change interest rates in order to alter 
the course of the cycle. However, there is one major limitation to this logic also; 
basically, changes in interest rates can come as a result of recession in domestic 
market or in neighbouring countries.
9  After  gaining  independence,  Croatia  developed  in  a  highly  open  economy  that  liberalized  fast 
in conformity to Washington consensus. Maybe this happened too quickly, because a young and 
uncompetitive economy such as Croatia was not ready for rivalry that the international markets and 
Neoliberalism brought. The result was strong growth of import and not so strong growth of export. It 
implied great external imbalances and import dependency. High export/import to GDP ratio and high 
trade deficit bear out the necessity of studying how import and export prices,exchange rate changes 
etc. shape Croatian trade and growth perspectives.Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia...   
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Furthermore,  historical  data  suggest  that  expansion  of  Croatian  economy  was 
always  followed  by  the  exchange  rate  appreciation,  and  vice  versa  during 
recessions.  Thus,  the  past  depreciation  of  exchange  rate  of  kuna  was  de  facto 
aftermath and not CNB monetary instrument, as some would conclude. Reason for 
that could be found in the fact that capital inflow produced appreciation pressure 
on exchange rate of kuna, which also resulted in public expenditure biased growth 
of the Croatian economy. Reduced inflow of capital (especially during the crisis) 
manifested itself as an increase in demand for foreign currency (euro), creating 
depreciation pressures on exchange rate of kuna, meaning that CNB had to decrease 
money supply and act counter-cyclically. In such a manner, exiting a crisis becomes 
even harder (Benazić and Tomić, 2013). 
If we know that exchange rate in Croatia holds the role of economic stabilizer 
rather than only a position of an active monetary instrument we can evaluate its 
movements. First, appreciation contributed to a lower inflation. Certainly, inflation 
would be much higher in the expansive years if the exchange rate of kuna had not 
caused appreciation effect. Second, we can notice a low exchange rate of kuna 
volatility  probably  because  the  exchange  rate  stability  was  the  most  important 
objective of CNB. By pursuing exchange rate of kuna stability during different 
phases  of  business  cycle,  CNB  preserved  macroeconomic  stability,  purchasing 
power of Croatian kuna, confidence in financial sector and positive expectations. 
Hence, balance sheet effect is very important. Namely, because of high levels of 
euroization exchange rate devaluation has recessionary impact on the economy; 
similarity with Fischer’s ‘Debt-Deflation Phenomenon’ (Fisher, 1933). 
Finally, we have observed the persistence of the variables (Table 3). Persistence 
indicates the length in which one variable stays within a phase of a business cycle. 
Both monetary and fiscal variables are persistent in a phase of a cycle for at least 
two periods, suggesting that variables fluctuate persistently and stabilize within 
specific economic periods. Most of the variables are persistent in three or even four 
periods, whereas real GDP, real general central government budget expenditures, 
CROBIS and interest rate on 365-day treasury bills showed no such characteristic 
which means that their cycle lasts a bit shorter. 
5. Results and discussion 
How can we then pull Croatian economy out of a recession? It is foremost that a 
solution is sought through attracting new foreign capital (FDI) that would increase 
money supply without an exchange rate effect. That would have an immense effect 
on the fiscal policy due to increased economic activity and consequently a rise in 
budget revenues. The EU accession in itself should boost the effect, mainly through 
EU funding programmes. However, we should also consider the future situation Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia... 
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when the EU funds would dry away either because of excessive deficit or due to 
a fall in country’s rating (something that Croatia is already experiencing) – which 
would discourage foreign investors and diminish inflow of the foreign currencies 
creating  additional  depreciation  pressure  on  the  exchange  rate,  scaling  down 
the money supply and pushing the Croatian economy deeper in recession. Thus, 
undisciplined fiscal policy and irrational budget expenditures could only worsen the 
already troubled situation. Furthermore, we must not forget the role of IMF with its 
positive and negative effects. The most significant positive effect is related to the 
inflow of new capital and consequential interest rate reductions, while the negative 
effects reflect in the loss of economic sovereignty in the decision-making and the 
fact  that  sometimes  IMF  measures  may  also  be  proved  wrong  (something  that 
history has proved over-and-over again).
Another solution could be found in more active if not aggressive role of monetary 
policy. Monetary policy should encourage economic awakening by manipulating 
all  available  instruments.  CNB  has  utilized  some  of  the  measures  by  lowering 
minimally  required  amount  of  foreign  currency  claims  and  banks’  reserve 
requirements,  by  special  lending  programmes,  syndicated  loans  with  Croatian 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (prior to the Funding for Lending, Risk 
Sharing Credits), etc. These measures did alleviate negative effects in the economy, 
but  unfortunately  did  not  stimulate  real  economic  progress.  In  continuation, 
Croatian fiscal policy during recession also needed to be more expansion oriented. 
Particularly during economic downturns, foreign loans could increase real money 
supply and enhance economic activity whilst maintaining the exchange rate stability. 
Currently, this is not an option for Croatia due to an already excessive indebtedness, 
possible deterioration in international ‘credit’ ratings and a threat of interest rates 
increase. Therefore, when monetary policy is constrained by high level of currency 
substitution (euroization), fiscal policy should be the main counter-cyclical policy 
tool. However, that requires fiscal discipline in good times, of which, in Croatia, 
there was none. The relevance of so-called international rating for fiscal policy is of 
great concern for every country; fiscal reform, deficit and debt reduction, restoration 
of economic growth and structural reforms such as state privatizations, reforms of 
the business climate, labour law amendments, planned pension reforms etc., would 
definitely have a positive effect on international ratings. Thus, immediate fiscal 
consolidation is necessary, in order to prevent further worsening of fiscal position. 
We can conclude that if Croatian fiscal policy had been more responsible in good 
times, deficit/debt would have been lower and fiscal policy could have been used 
to help restore growth after the crisis. Finally, some other factors such as revival 
of the business climate, improved judicial system, diminished corruption and etc. 
could also improve effectiveness and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies 
in Croatia over different phases in a business cycle. Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia...   
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6. Conclusions
Our hypothesis was pointed towards testing whether fiscal and monetary policies 
in Croatia are coordinated over a business cycle in order to answer the question 
can  they  and  in  what  way  determine  the  cyclical  movements.  Results  suggest 
that  both  fiscal  and  monetary  variables  exhibit  counter-cyclical  behaviour  with 
relatively  weak  correlation  to  the  real  GDP  which  brings  us  to  the  conclusion 
that  two  economic  policies  are  in  fact  coordinated  during  a  business  cycle; 
however, their practical reach is somewhat ambiguous. Namely, due to limitations 
that  arise  from  different  internal  (exchange  rate  stability,  fiscal  austerity)  and 
external  factors  (Maastricht  criteria,  Fiscal  Stability  Treaty),  macroeconomic 
management in Croatia is confined in applicability of distinct economic measures 
within different stages of a business cycle. In such manner, fiscal and monetary 
authorities  had  consciously  hand  over  its  governing  ability  to  predetermined 
rule of exchange rate stability and externally defined standards. Disproportion in 
lags/leads behaviour of the Croatian macroeconomic variables (for example real 
budget  revenues  and  expenditures,  money  supply,  exchange  rates)  suggest  that 
possible fine-tuning efforts could turn into unintended destabilizing forces because 
with  uncertainty  about  contemporaneous  economic  activity  when  data  provide 
mixed signal there is no precision whatsoever for implementation of appropriate 
instrument for responding to economic shocks. Consequently, we conclude that 
fiscal and monetary policies in Croatia are constrained, therefore they often cannot 
accomplish their counter-cyclical role. Our paper is a supplement to the strand of 
literature in Croatia that tries to evaluate controversies over fiscal and monetary 
policies in a manner that it answers the question of compatibility i.e. coordination 
of these two economic pillars as well as it offers deep and constructive analytical 
commentary.  There  are  two  major  shortcoming  of  this  paper  that  a  reader  can 
detect. First is relatively short time series and second is the generalizability of some 
conclusions. Both can impose scantiness in economic reasoning; however, we find 
this argument as an incentive for further research that might include more complex 
methods of analysis and international comparison, especially with the EU countries. 
Not being evasive towards limitations, we believe that our conclusions could bear 
important implications for the Croatian macroeconomic management, especially 
for  financial  prospect  and  development  perspective.  In  the  times  of  economic 
downfall, due to a specific structure of the Croatian economy (high indebtedness, 
euroization, import dependency etc.) and the above mentioned policy constraints, 
fiscal and monetary authorities cannot resort to expansive economic measures. In 
other words, it means that macroeconomic management in Croatia needs to create 
such economic framework which will assure fiscal discipline, restructuring of the 
economy in every manner necessary, curtailment of a public and foreign debt and 
restoration of the faith in domestic currency (considering that Croatia is still not a 
part of EMU). Such tendency will surely enable adequate functioning of fiscal and 
monetary policies in Croatia.    Manuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia... 
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Appendix 
Table 3: Autocorrelations (ACF) – (persistence analysis)
Variables t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
GDP_real  0.7341*** 0.4219*** 0.1393 -0.0496
REV_real / GDP_real  0.6748*** 0.4465*** 0.2681** 0.1304
DEF_real 0.3414*** 0.0364 -0.2254** -0.3198***
G_real  0.7165*** 0.4599*** 0.1391 -0.0956
REV_real  0.6988*** 0.4818*** 0.2598** 0.1056
EXPN_real  0.4568*** 0.3789*** 0.1226 0.0282
GOV_DEBT_real / GDP_real 0.8679*** 0.6833*** 0.5134*** 0.3475**
CROBIS 0.7604*** 0.3623** 0.0555 -0.1059
T-BILLS (365) 0.7996*** 0.4858*** 0.1983 -0.0530
M1_real  0.8269*** 0.6812*** 0.4715*** 0.2828**
CRED_real 0.8352*** 0.6032*** 0.3908*** 0.1639
MMR-A  0.6403*** 0.3069*** -0.0299 -0.2478**
MMR-O  0.6668*** 0.3161*** -0.0758 -0.3364***
LTR 0.1656 0.0979 -0.2117* -0.2661**
YIELD 0.7071*** 0.3513** 0.0140 -0.2803*
HRK/EUR 0.6353*** 0.3744*** 0.2180* 0.0497
REER 0.7494*** 0.4682*** 0.2204* 0.0174
Note: ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculationManuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia...   
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Table 4: Bivariate (pairwise) Granger causality tests
Variables
Cause real GDP Real GDP caused
F-stat. Prob. F-stat. Prob.
REV _real / GDP real  0.80120 0.5532 1.90074 0.1076
DEF_real 0.98536 0.4343 1.15437 0.3422
G_real  0.79416 0.5581 0.65002 0.6626
REV_real  0.94547 0.4585 2.25697 0.0601
EXPN_real  0.77825 0.5693 1.21331 0.3140
GOV_DEBT_real / GDP_real 3.39218 0.0178 3.01044 0.0292
CROBIS 2.08599 0.1009 5.03617 0.0025
T-BILLS (365) 6.14661 0.0008 5.24357 0.0020
M1_real  1.56877 0.1827 3.26376 0.0113
CRED_real 5.41089 0.0004 0.44333 0.8164
MMR-A  0.69104 0.6322 1.12849 0.3552
MMR-O  0.60995 0.6926 1.00228 0.4243
LTR 2.26860 0.0589 0.46750 0.7989
YIELD 1.37502 0.2672 2.56546 0.0526
HRK/EUR 1.26189 0.2922 2.85734 0.0222
REER 2.28486 0.0574 6.14525 0.0001
Note: Bivariate (pairwise) models with each variable and the real GDP, and five lags. 
Source: Authors’ calculationManuel Benazić, Daniel Tomić • The evaluation of fiscal and monetary policy in Croatia... 
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Ocjena fiskalne i monetarne politike u Republici Hrvatskoj tijekom 
poslovnog ciklusa
Manuel Benazić1, Daniel Tomić2
Sažetak 
U  radu  se  teži  vrednovanju  učinaka  fiskalne  i  monetarne  politike  u  Hrvatskoj 
tijekom  poslovnog  ciklusa.  Korištenjem  Hodrick-Prescott  filtra  za  izdvajanje 
cikličkog kretanja iz makroekonomskih varijabli za razdoblje 1994.–2013., ovaj 
rad povijesno povezuje odnose fiskalne/monetarne politike u Hrvatskoj testiranjem 
hipoteze jesu li ova dva ekonomska stupa zapravo koordinirana tijekom poslovnog 
ciklusa. Utvrdili smo kako i fiskalne i monetarne varijable pokazuju protu-cikličko 
kretanje i relativno slabu povezanost s realnim BDP-om, što nam sugerira da su 
dvije ekonomske politike zaista koordinirane, međutim njihov doseg je ograničen. 
U  konačnici,  zaključak  je  da  su  fiskalna  i  monetarna  politika  u  Hrvatskoj 
ograničene internim i eksternim faktorima i stoga često ne mogu ispunjavati svoju 
protu-cikličku ulogu.
Ključne riječi: makroekonomski management, ocjena ekonomske politike, fiskalna 
politika, monetarna politika, poslovni ciklusi, Hodrick-Prescott filter, Hrvatska
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